excerpt from article by RICHARD POSNER, blogger and Federal Judge
The criticisms of the Court’s reasoning are several. First, the notion of “coordination” is vague, and tacit coordination with a candidate or a party seems to occupy the same never-never land as tacit collusion in antitrust law. It can be quite effective yet is hard to condemn as actual coordination. Allies of the candidate or members of the party can run the super PAC, and without even talking to the candidate or to party officials can figure out what kind of political advertising will be helpful to the candidate. Most super PAC advertising has been negative—that is, has attacked opponents of the candidate whom the super PAC favors—because positive advertising would be difficult without explicit coordination; the reason is that candidates tend to be vague and protean about what they favor, in order to maintain their freedom of action and reaction, so a super PAC could operate at cross-purposes with its favored candidate if it advertised in support of a program that it thought the candidate would favor. In addition, negative political advertising is usually more effective than positive.
It thus is difficult to see what practical difference there is between super PAC donations and direct campaign donations, from a corruption standpoint. A super PAC is a valuable weapon for a campaign, as the heavy expenditures of Restore Our Future, the large super PAC that supports Romey and has attacked his opponents, proves; the donors to it are known; and it is unclear why they should expect less quid pro quo from their favored candidate if he’s successful than a direct donor to the candidate’s campaign would be. [MORE]